NOW we know why the "negotiations" for what
would emerge as the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) were
conducted under a cloak of secrecy. Not a single byte of the draft was
made available to other government functionaries, not even the
treaty-making arm of the Philippine state, the Senate, much less to the
media and the general public.
In fact, to everyone’s consternation, no
copies of the EDCA were released even after it was signed by Philippine
Defense Secretary Gazmin and United States Ambassador Goldberg hours
before the arrival of US President Obama for his swing-by visit to
Manila. For surely, had the drafts and the final text of the EDCA been
made public earlier, these would have raised the nationalist hackles of
Filipinos, activist and non-activist alike, slowed down if not totally
aborted the talks, and soured even further what the Aquino
administration was trying mightily to project as a feel-good,
arms-clasped coming together of two long-time friends and allies. The
Aquino government only posted the EDCA on its official web site after
Mr. Obama had left the country.
Despite its deceitful language, it is obvious that the "agreement" does
not only allow the US to impinge on Philippine national sovereignty and
territorial integrity by gaining access to so-called "Agreed Locations"
purportedly in exchange for enhancing the Philippines’ external defense
capabilities as well as boosting its capacity to respond to disasters.
Apart from a general statement in Article I, Purpose and Scope, "This
Agreement deepens defense cooperation between the Parties... improving
interoperability of the Parties’ forces, and for the AFP,
addressing short-term capabilities gaps, promoting long-term
modernization and helping maintain and develop additional maritime
security, maritime domain awareness, and humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief capabilities..." there is no other provision
categorically stating how this objective shall be achieved. There is no
clear, reciprocal provision stating just exactly how the Philippines
will supposedly benefit from the EDCA.
On the contrary, Article III, Agreed Locations, says "Given the
mutuality of benefits, the Parties agree that the Philippines shall make
Agreed Locations available to the US forces without rental
(boldface is ours) or similar costs." We recall that one of the main
objections to the retention of US bases in sprawling areas of Central
Luzon was the US refusal to pay a user’s fee while the country
definitely shouldered huge lost opportunity costs by hosting the US
bases.
And while in Article IV, Equipment, Supplies and Materiel, "The
Philippines authorizes the US forces to preposition and store defense
equipment, supplies and materiel ...at Agreed Locations," Section 3
states that "(t)he prepositioned materiel of US forces shall be for the exclusive use of US forces (boldface ours) ..."
And in Article VII, Utilities and Communications, "The Philippines
hereby grants to US forces and US contractors the use of water,
electricity, and other public utilities on terms and conditions,
including rents or charges, no less favorable than those available to
the AFP of the Government of the Philippines in like circumstances, less charges for taxes and similar fees, which shall be for the account of the Philippine government (boldface ours)."
Thus from these few provisions alone, the EDCA is grossly lopsided. But
over and above this, a close reading of the EDCA reveals that it is
indeed a sell-out, nothing less than the surrender of our national
sovereignty to our former colonizer, the US of A.
The EDCA allows a much bigger, in fact unlimited, number of US troops to
be stationed, together with their unlimited number of prepositioned war
vessels and armaments; in unspecified locations, possibly anywhere in
the country to be provided by the Philippine government; to undertake a
host of activities amounting to using the country as a launching pad for
US military adventures; and in a veritable open-ended duration of stay.
Article I on Purpose and Scope, which is supposed to define and delimit
the scope of allowed activities, ends with a deliberately vague and
catch-all phrase "...and such other activities that may be agreed upon
by the Parties." This opens up the scope of activities that "the US may
take in the territory of the Philippines in relation to the access to
and use of Agreed Locations" to any other conceivable activity that is
not explicitly stipulated in the Agreement.
One might argue that the Agreement categorically states that these
activities are "within" and in relation to its "access to and use of
Agreed Locations" which, in Art. II Definitions, "may be listed in an
annex appended to this agreement." However, the listing is not intended
to define the territorial limits of these activities, since the
provision again ends with the phrase, "...and may be further described
in implementing arrangements."
The EDCA is thus far worse than the return of the former US bases and
facilities in the country that were booted out by the Philippine
Senate’s rejection of the bases agreement in 1991. Then, the US troops
and war materiel were confined in well-defined or specific areas, albeit
with extraterritorial rights, and their sea and air war machines could
only dock in or land on these military bases. Whereas now, while the
EDCA states that US facilities shall only be set up in "Agreed
Locations" and again, purportedly, without exclusivity, this proviso is
negated by the caveat allowing "Agreed Locations" anywhere both Parties
agree on.
A specific provision in Art III, section 2 states, "When requested the
Designated Authority of the Philippines shall assist in facilitating
transit or temporary access by US forces to public land and facilities
(including roads, ports and airfields) including those owned or
controlled by local governments, and to other land and facilities..."
Ergo contrary to the Philippine and US governments’ propaganda that only
AFP facilities will host the US troops and war material or will
be the site of their activities, the EDCA opens the way for American
boots to go anywhere they need or wish to go in Philippine territory
including "roads, ports and airfields" used entirely for civilian
purposes.
As to the duration of the EDCA, Article XII, Section 4 states, "This
agreement shall have an initial term of 10 years, and thereafter it shall continue in force automatically
(boldface ours) unless terminated by either Party..." This is a far cry
from what the Aquino government wants to make us believe that the EDCA
has a definite duration of 10 years the way the RP-US bases agreement
had a definite termination in 1991.
A most objectionable and potentially explosive issue, being a case where
the Executive branch has clearly overstepped its bounds, is the
provision in Art XI, Resolution of Disputes. Any dispute "arising under
this Agreement" must be resolved "...exclusively through consultations
between the Parties.... (and) shall not be referred to any national or
international court, tribunal, or other similar body, or to any third
party for settlement, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties."
This is supposed to mean that neither the Senate nor Supreme Court can
question or revise the Agreement. This is a blatantly unconstitutional
provision, violating the principle and letter of checks and balances and
division of powers in government. Clearly, the Executive has encroached
on the Legislative and Judicial branches’ powers and prerogatives in
barring the subjection of the Agreement to legislative or judicial
review.
In any case, it is now also clear why the EDCA was "negotiated" in
addition to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and Mutual Logistics
Support Agreement (MLSA) which had already in principle and practice
opened up Philippine territory and resources to US military forces and
activities. The EDCA was crafted to further legalize and justify more
obtrusive increased US presence and activities which the vague VFA and
MLSA provisions could not as easily or evidently cover up.
source: Businessworld / Streetwise - Carol Pagaduan-Araullo
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