The Judicial and Bar Council, April 23, 1995

by Justice Isagani A. Cruz 

In 1995 on November 2, 2015 at 11:52 pm

THE Judicial and Bar Council is a creation of the 1987 Constitution and did away with the confirmation of judicial appointments by the Commission on Appointments. The purpose was to depoliticize the judiciary by removing as much as possible the influence of politics in the selection of judges and in their subsequent conduct in office.

It was felt that by continuing the old practice, the new charter would be perpetuating one of the most serious threats to the independence of the judiciary. Judges appointed or confirmed with the help of padrinos tended to repay their debt of gratitude with rigged decisions at the behest of patrons cashing in their chips. Others curried favor with senators and congressmen in hopes that these legislators may prove helpful for future promotions and confirmation.

The Judicial and Bar Council is a constitutional body. It is composed of the chief justice as chairman, the secretary of justice and a member of Congress as ex officio members, and a representative of the integrated bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. The regular members are appointed by the president of the Philippines for four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Each of the seven members has one vote. The representation from Congress is shared by a senator and a congressman, each of whom casts one-half vote.

Charges against aspirants for judicial positions are considered in private by the JBC. Complainants may be given a chance to support their objections and the candidate may be allowed to refute them. Hearings are not obligatory, however, and the council may simply act summarily on the charges. There is no right to be nominated after all, and the decisions of the body are highly discretionary.

Among the criteria for the nomination of a candidate are competence, integrity, record in the bar examination, experience in the legal profession, and personality. One perennial aspirant for the Supreme Court has been consistently rejected for lack of delicadeza in openly and personally campaigning for his nomination., Another candidate has been bypassed several times because of a rather servile manner and serious doubts about his integrity and morality.

I sat as a consultant of the JBC for some time and was especially impressed with the diligence of the members, particularly the regular ones, in screening hundreds of applications for the various judicial vacancies. These members even go around the country to interview prospective nominees, many of whom are unable to come to Manila for financial and other reasons. Visits of the JBC members and the schedule of interviews are announced in advance by the local IBP chapters.

But for all the improvement it has effected in the selection of judges and justices, the JBC has not completely succeeded in resisting the influence of politics. The secretary of justice is in that body to express and protect the wishes of Malacañang and there are also the members of the legislature whose principal role is to submit to the council the recommendees of their colleagues in Congress. The fact that the regular members of the JBC are appointed by the president may also emasculate their independence. Where the president’s own preferences are at stake, it is not unlikely that the chief justice may find his only ally in the retired justice of the Supreme Court, but even this is not certain.

The staggering of the terms of the regular members at yearly intervals is good, but perhaps there should also be a prohibition against their reappointment as in the case of the constitutional commissions. The secretary of justice could be retained for his valuable insights in the judicial and prosecutorial systems but only as a consultant without the right to vote. The representation from Congress should be taken out as inimical to the very purpose of the creation of the JBC.

The JBC is supposed to make at least three nominations for each judicial vacancy, but no maximum number is prescribed. The bigger the number of nominations, the wider the discretion given to the president and the weaker the independence of the council becomes. At one selection of the nominee to the Supreme Court, the JBC chose five names but when the Malacañang candidate was not included, his supporters moved to expand the list. This is one way a candidate favored by the president may be accommodated and eventually appointed.

I believe the incumbent justices of the Supreme Court should be consulted on the filling of any vacancy in the body because they will be working with whoever is chosen to sit with them and it is imperative that they have confidence in his ability and integrity. It takes only one member to throw a monkey wrench into their proceedings and make the entire membership ineffective if not suspect, or at least embarrassed by the pariah among them.